It has long been established that the national government has "broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, ..." Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941); and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

But a lawfully admitted resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a state must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, it is now settled law that a resident alien is in most respects a full member of our society subject to duties as well as being entitled to most of the rights of citizenship.

As noted in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), "aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces", they may live within a state for many years and contribute significantly to its welfare and growth.
The Court in Crane also relied on the concept, since rejected, that "whatever is a privilege rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship". Crane v. New York, supra at 164. The doctrinal foundation of Crane was undermined, however, in Takahashi, supra, and it retains no force in the present context.

Indeed, subsequent decisions have moved significantly in the opposite direction, holding that:

"Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny." Graham v. Richardson, supra at 371, 376.

(Did: What other cases, if any, should be cited here?)

It is thus now clear from the recent decisions of this Court that resident aliens "as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular minority. (See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, & 152-153, n. 4 (1938)) for whom [a] heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."

Graham, supra at 372. See also Takahashi, supra at 420.
hardly involve matters of state; nor are they powers which are likely to result in any conflict of interest with another country or enable the alien attorney to act to the detriment of this country.

*Attorneys frequently represent foreign countries and the nationals of such countries in litigation in the courts of the United States, as well as in other matters in this country. In such representations the duties of the attorney, subject to his duty as an "officer" of the court, are to further the interests of his client by all lawful means, even if such interests are in conflict with those of the United States or a state. Such representation involves no conflict of interest in an invidious sense. Rather, it casts the attorney in his honored and traditional role of acting as the authorized but independent agent to vindicate the legal rights of a client, whomever it may be. Of course, it is conceivable that an alien licensed to practice law in this country could find himself in a position where he might be called upon to represent his country of citizenship against the United States in circumstances where there may be conflicts between his oaths to the two countries. In such rare situations, an honorable person, whether an alien or not, would decline the representation.

Note to Bill:

It seems to me that the "conflict of interest" possibility needs to be addressed a little more fully than your draft. You may think of a better way to do it. Also, I wanted to omit the reference to "customary concomitants", as I think Connecticut is probably one of few states which authorizes lawyers to sign writs and issue subpoenas.
It is undisputed that Connecticut has a legitimate interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law".


See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 ( );

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 234 ( );

(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7. There is no question as to the validity of requiring an applicant, as a precondition to admission to the bar, to take such an oath. *Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond*, *supra*, at 161-164.
And once admitted to the bar, attorneys are subject to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions and disbarment.
10. See, e.g., Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879).

Apart from the courts, the profession itself has long subjected its members to discipline under codes or canons of professional ethics.

As early as 1908 the American Bar Association adopted 32 Canons of Professional Ethics. In 1970(?), following several years of study and reexamination, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved a new and comprehensive Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides detailed ethical prescriptions and well as a comprehensive code of disciplinary rules.

The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility has since been approved or adopted in ___ states, including Connecticut. Reports of the American Bar Association, Vol. 97, (1972) p. ____.

Note to Bill:

I do not have the 1972 report of the ABA. Check the library to see whether it is available there. If not take a look at p. 676 and 677 of Volume 96 which I do have on my shelf and which shows on p. 677 that Connecticut was expected to adopt the Code in the spring of 1971. If the 1973 volume is not available, call the Washington office of the ABA and talk to Don Channell who is in charge there. Tell him you are calling at my request and ask him if he has a copy of the report of this Committee made to the ABA annual meeting last summer or possibly even the most recent report was made this weekend at the midwinter meeting in Cleveland. Then ask Mr. Channell to tell you what Connecticut has done and give you the date of adoption if shown by report.
It is further contended that in Connecticut an attorney "is an officer of the court who acts by and with the authority of the state, and that - because of "this power which he has been given" - the state is concerned with the integrity of the attorney's "exercise of actual government power". Appellee's Brief p. 1.

We note at the outset that this argument goes beyond the opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, which recognized that "an attorney is 'not an officer within the ordinary meaning of that term'". 162 Conn. at . The committee's concept of an attorney's participation in "actual government power" finds no support in fact or authority. In Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956) in opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Court distinguished attorneys from "officers within the conventional meaning of that term":

'It has been stated many times that lawyers are 'officers of the court.' One of the most frequently repeated statements to this effect appears in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378. The Court pointed out there, however, that an attorney was not an 'officer' within the ordinary meaning of that term. Certainly nothing that was said in Ex parte Garland or in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges. Unlike these officials a lawyer is engaged in a private profession, important though it be to our system of justice. In general he makes his own decisions, follows his own best judgment, collects his own fees and runs his own business. The word 'officer' as it has
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always been applied to lawyers conveys a different meaning from the word 'officer' as applied to people serving as officers within the conventional meaning of that term. " 350 U.S. at 405.

Attorneys do indeed occupy professional positions of responsibility and influence that impose on them duties correlative with their vital right of access to the courts. Attorney also, by virtue of their professional aptitudes and natural interests, have been leaders throughout the history of our country in government at all levels. Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue of being attorneys. Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law place one so close to the core of the political process as to consider him a participant in the shaping of government policy or the exercise of government power. In short, the practice of law is not a position in government; it is a profession from which qualified resident aliens may not be validly excluded.
The Court has consistently emphasized that a state which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy burden of justification", McLaurin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the state to meet certain standards of proof. At the outset, there must be a showing that the state's interest or purpose is "constitutionally acceptable". Id., at 192; the mere desire to punish or disfavor resident aliens as a class would, of course, not be a permissible purpose. The state also must show that its interest could fairly be characterized as "substantial", "overriding," or "compelling". Finally, the state must show that the use of the suspect classification is "necessary to the accomplishment" of its interest or purpose.


II

We hold that the Committee, acting on behalf of the state, has not carried its heavy burden of justification. The Committee does not assert that the state interest in upholding Rule 8(1) is to favor citizens by protecting them from the competition of resident alien lawyers. Rather, the Committee's position is that the state action is justified by the special role of the lawyer in our society.
The Court has consistently emphasized that a state which adopts a suspect classification "bears a heavy burden of justification," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the state to meet certain standards of proof. At the outset, there must be a showing that the state's interest or purpose is "constitutionally acceptable." Id., at 192; the mere desire to punish or disfavor resident aliens as a class would, of course, not be a permissible purpose. The state also must show that its interest could fairly be characterized as "substantial," "overriding," or "compelling." Finally, the state must show that the use of the suspect classification is reasonably "necessary to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 196; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).

No. 1336 - Griffiths

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a novel question regarding the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the qualifications which a State may require for admission to the bar. Appellant, Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of Netherlands, came to the United States in 1965, originally as a visitor. In 1967, she married a citizen of the United States and became a resident of Connecticut. After her graduation from law school, she applied in 1970 for permission to take the Connecticut bar examination. The bar association found her qualified in all respects save that she was not a citizen of the United States, as required by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963), but on that account refused to allow her to take the examination. She then sought judicial relief on the ground that the regulation was unconstitutional. Her claim was rejected first by the Superior Court and ultimately by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 162 Conn. 249, 294 A.2d 281 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 966 (1972), and now hold that the regulation unconstitutionally discriminates against resident aliens.
I.

We begin by sketching the background against which the State Bar Examining Committee, appellee here, attempts to justify the total preclusion of aliens from the practice of law. It has long been established that a resident alien is a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's directive that a State must not "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). While Congress has wide power to regulate immigration and naturalization, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), a lawfully-admitted resident alien is in most respects a full member of our society and must, under the Constitution, be treated as such. Indeed, as the Court recently held,

"Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny."


The general principles regarding the rights of resident aliens under the Equal Protection Clause have found application in a number
of cases involving state laws interfering with the efforts of resident aliens to earn a livelihood. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, this Court invalidated a municipal ordinance regulating the operation of laundries, on the ground that the ordinance was discriminatorily enforced against Chinese operators. Several decades later, the Court struck down an Arizona statute which required employers of more than five persons to employ eighty percent "qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof." Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 35 (1915). As stated for the Court by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:

"It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure. If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial of equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words." 239 U.S., at 41.

On similar reasoning, finally, the Court ruled unconstitutional a California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
persons "ineligible to citizenship," Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).

To be sure, the course of decisions protecting the employment rights of resident aliens has not been an unbroken one. In Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), a statute prohibiting the employment of aliens on public works projects was upheld over an equal protection challenge, apparently on the theory that the State might constitutionally favor citizens over aliens in the distribution of limited resources, in that case a limited number of job openings. As explained in Graham v. Richardson, supra, 403 U.S., at 372-374, however, that theory was repudiated by implication in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm., supra, and retains no force in the present context. The mere desire to favor citizens in the allocation of employment or other economic opportunities no longer serves as an adequate justification for discrimination against resident aliens.

II.

The Examining Committee insists nonetheless that even if the State may not practice or mandate employment discrimination against
resident aliens as a general matter, the special role of the attorney
justifies excluding aliens from the practice of law. In Connecticut,
the Committee points out, the maxim that an attorney is an "officer of
the court" is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes every
attorney admitted to practice a "commissioner of the Superior Court."
As such, an attorney has authority to "sign writs, issue subpoenas,
take recognizances, and administer oaths," Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-85,
and, in so doing, to command the assistance of a county sheriff or
town constable. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-90. Because of these and other
powers,

"The courts not only demand their loyalty,
confidence and respect but also require them
to function in a manner which will foster public
confidence in the profession and, consequently,
the judicial system." 162 Conn., at 262-263,
294 A2d, at 287.

It is undisputed that Connecticut "has a legitimate interest in
determining whether [an applicant] has the qualities of character and
professional competence requisite to the practice of law," Baird v.

By the same token, though, it is too late to suggest that the standards for admission to the bar are not subject to constitutional constraints. "Any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law," Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), and may not be "invidiously discriminatory." Id., at 239.

No claim is made that resident aliens as a class lack the competence or personal character necessary for the practice of law. But, in defense of the rationality of distinguishing between citizens and resident aliens, the Committee contrasts the citizen's undivided commitment to this country with the resident alien's possible conflict of loyalties. From this, the Committee concludes that a resident alien attorney might in the exercise of her functions ignore her responsibilities to the courts and her clients in favor of the interests of a foreign power.

We find this danger a remote and unreal one. The Committee makes no convincing demonstration that the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interests of the United
States. It in no way denigrates the attorney's high responsibilities to observe that the powers "to sign writs, issue subpoenas, take recognizances, and administer oaths" are customary concomitants of the practice of law rather than matters of state. Nor has the Committee shown the relevance of citizenship to the likelihood that an attorney will protect faithfully the interests of her clients.

Even if the Committee's contentions were treated as having demonstrated that some resident aliens may be unsuited for the practice of law, that would be no justification for a wholesale ban. The Committee calls our attention to Pearl Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Harrington, 38 F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass.), aff'd. per curiam 313 U.S. 549 (1941), which upheld the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute barring aliens from positions as resident managers of alien insurance companies doing business in Massachusetts. While the Court's summary disposition in Pearl does not afford insight into the grounds of its decision, the affirmance was presumably based on an analysis most fully elaborated in Clarke v. Dekebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). There, the Court was faced with a challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting the issuance to aliens of licenses to operate pool and billiard rooms.
Characterizing the business as one having "harmful and vicious tendencies," the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the ordinance: "It was competent for the city to make such a choice, not shown to be irrational, by excluding from the conduct of a dubious business an entire class rather than its objectionable members selected by more empirical methods." 274 U.S., at 397.

This easily expandable proposition supported discrimination against resident aliens in a wide variety of occupations. 5/

At least after Graham v. Richardson, supra, such reasoning is no longer sufficient to justify discrimination against aliens. It is of the essence of "strict judicial scrutiny," 403 U.S., at 372, that a State must where possible use "empirical methods" rather than broad proscriptions to separate the qualified from the unqualified.

In the present context, Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law. Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires a new attorney to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform
her functions faithfully and honestly" and a "Commissioner's oath" to "support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Connecticut." Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a character investigation to insure in any given case "that an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath,' Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132," Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, 401 U.S., at 164. And once admitted to the bar, as the cases cited by the Committee amply demonstrate, attorneys are subject to discipline of abuse of their powers. In sum, the Committee has simply not established that it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional standards.

III.

In its brief, the Examining Committee makes another, quite different argument in support of Section 8(1). Appellee's Brief, p. 10. Its thrust is not that resident aliens lack the attributes necessary to maintain high standards in the legal profession, but rather that attorneys must be citizens almost as a matter of definition.
The argument builds upon the exclusion of aliens from the franchise in all fifty States and their disqualification under the Constitution from holding office as President, Art. 2, § 1, cl. 4, or as a member of the House of Representatives, Art. 1, § 2, cl. 2, or of the Senate, Art. 1, § 3, cl. 3. These and myriad other federal and state statutory and constitutional provisions reflect, the Committee contends, a pervasive recognition that "participation in the government structure as voters and office holders," Appellee's Brief, p. 11, is inescapably an aspect of citizenship.

Whatever the merits of this view in other contexts, we are satisfied that the attorney does not occupy a position so close to the core of the political process as to warrant the exclusion of aliens. The attorney as attorney neither selects those who will set governmental policy nor sets it herself. The practice of law does, of course, impinge upon the political process broadly conceived, but notwithstanding the powers conferred by custom and law, the attorney is principally the representative of her clients.
Accordingly, we hold that Section 8(1) violates the Equal Protection Clause. The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
FOOTNOTES

1. Appellant is eligible for naturalization by reason of her marriage to a citizen of the United States and residence in the United States for more than three years, 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a). She has not filed a declaration of intent to become a citizen of the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1445(f), and has no present intention of doing so. Appellant's Brief, p. 4. In order to become a citizen, appellant would be required to renounce her citizenship of the Netherlands. 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a).

2. The rule was first promulgated in 1879. Application of Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 253, 294 A. 2d 281, 283 (1972). Before that time, aliens were apparently admitted to practice on the same basis as citizens.

3. Because we find that the rule denied equal protection, we do not reach appellant's other claims.
4. Appellant denies that this was indeed the State's purpose in requiring citizenship for the practice of law, noting citizenship is also required of practitioners in other fields, including hairdressers and cosmeticians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-250, architects, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-291, and sanitarians, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-361. Because we dispose of the case on other grounds, we do not consider this claim.

5. See cases collected at Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 Columbia Law Review 1012, 1021-1023 (1957) (restrictions ranging from the vending of soft drinks to the selling of lightning rods). The full scale of restrictions imposed on the work opportunities of aliens in 1946 is shown by M. Kassowitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law 190-211 (1946).
6. The text of the attorney’s oath is as follows:

"You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor consent to any to be done in court, and, if you know of any to be done, you will give information thereof to the judges, or one of them, that it may be reformed; you will not wittingly, or willingly promote, sue or cause to be sued, any false or unlawful suit, or give aid, or consent, to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or malice; but will exercise the office of attorney, within the court wherein you may practice, according to the best of your learning and discretion, and with fidelity, as well to the court as to your client, so help you God.

J. S. App., p. 44.

7. Because the commissioner’s oath is an oath to "support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of Connecticut, so long as you continue to be a citizen thereof" [emphasis added], appellant could not of course take the oath as prescribed. To the extent that the oath reiterates Rule 8(1)’s citizenship requirement, it shares the same constitutional *defects* when required of prospective members of the bar.
8. We find no merit in the contention that only citizens can in good conscience take an oath to support the Constitution.

We note that all persons inducted into the armed services, including resident aliens, are required by 10 U.S.C. 502 to take the following oath:

"I, __________, to solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God."

If aliens can take this oath when the nation is making use of their services in the national defense, resident alien applicants for admission to the bar can surely not be precluded, as a class, from taking an oath to support the Constitution, on the theory they cannot take the oath in good faith.

9. Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-21 (citing, e.g., Doolittle v. Clark, 47 Conn. 316 (1879)).
II.

We hold that the committee, acting on behalf of the state, has not carried its heavy burden of justification. The state's ultimate interest here implicated is to assure the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law. It is undisputed that a state has a legitimate and substantial interest in determining whether an applicant possesses "the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law." Law Students Research Counsel v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159 (1970). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1961). But no question is raised in this case as to applicants' character or general fitness. Rather, the sole basis for disqualification is her status as a resident alien. The committee defends Rule 8(1), requiring that applicants for admission to the bar be citizens of the United States, on the ground that the special role of the lawyer justifies excluding aliens from the practice of law. It is pointed out that in Connecticut the maxim that a lawyer is an "officer of the court"
is given concrete meaning by a statute which makes every lawyer a
"commissioner of the Superior Court." As such, a lawyer has authority

to "sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, administer oaths and

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A.2d, at 287.

The committee also emphasizes a citizen's undivided allegiance to
this country and contrasts this with a resident alien's possible conflict of

loyalties. From this, the committee concludes that a resident alien lawyer
might in the exercise of his functions ignore his responsibilities to the courts - and even his clients - in favor of the interest of a foreign power.

We find these arguments unconvincing. It in no way denigrates a lawyer’s high responsibilities to observe that the powers "to sign writs and subpoenas, take recognizances, and administer oaths" hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such extraordinary responsibility as to entrust them only to citizens. Nor do we think that the practice of law offers meaningful opportunities adversely to affect the interest of the United States. Certainly the committee has failed to show the relevance of citizenship to any likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients.

It is settled doctrine that a state’s requirements for admission to the bar are subject to constitutional constraints.

"A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness
or capacity to practice law. *Douglas v. Noble*, 261 U.S. 165; *Cummings v. Missouri*, 4 Wall., 277, 319-320. Cf. *Nebbia v. New York*, 291 U.S. 502. Obviously an applicant could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory. Cf. *Yick Wo v. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356."

"Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1956)."

And at least since *Graham v. Richardson*, supra, a classification directed against aliens is a suspect one, imposing upon the state the heavy burden of justification mentioned above. Acknowledging, as we have, that a state does have a substantial interest in the qualifications of those admitted to the practice of law, the arguments advanced by the committee fall short of showing that the classification established by Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book (1963) is reasonably necessary to the promoting or safeguarding of this interest. There is certainly no justification for a broad proscription against all resident aliens with no effort being required to distinguish the qualified from the unqualified. Connecticut has wide freedom to gauge
on a case-by-case basis the fitness of an applicant to practice law.

Connecticut can, and does, require appropriate training and familiarity with Connecticut law. Apart from such tests of competence, it requires a new lawyer to take both an "attorney's oath" to perform his functions faithfully and honestly and a "commissioner's oath" to "support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of Connecticut."

Appellant has indicated her willingness and ability to subscribe to the substance of both oaths, and Connecticut may quite properly conduct a character investigation to insure in any given case "that an applicant is not one who 'swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.'" Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132. Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, supra, 401 U.S., at 164. Moreover, once admitted to the bar, lawyers are subject to continuing scrutiny by the organized bar and the courts. In addition to discipline for unprofessional conduct, the range of post-admission
sanctions extends from judgments for contempt to criminal prosecutions
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