Marbury v. Madison held that it is "emphatically" the power of the judiciary to "say what the law is." Notwithstanding the conviction of this statement, the Supreme Court has for many years deferred to "reasonable" interpretations of constitutional and statutory provisions rendered by Congress and executive agencies, respectively. Congress, exercising its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact "appropriate" remedial and enforcement legislation, gives meaning to the constitutional guarantee of "equal protection." Similarly, agencies routinely interpret and define statutory provisions that are vague or ambiguous. The Rehnquist Court has significantly weakened legislative and executive interpretive power. This Article reviews and examines the Court’s recent Section 5 jurisprudence, under which Congress must satisfy a form of heightened judicial scrutiny in order to exercise its power to construe constitutional rights. After United States v. Mead Corp., decided last term, agency interpretations, likewise, will in many instances fail to qualify for traditional Chevron deference, forcing agencies to vie for a weaker form of judicial "respect" for legal interpretations. The Article links the Section 5 precedents and the Mead doctrine as manifestations of the ascendancy of Marbury’s core principle—that it is "emphatically," and with respect to legislative interpretations perhaps exclusively, the judicial function to "say what the law is." The Article disagrees with commentators who have characterized the Rehnquist Court’s recent Section 5 precedents as incursions into Congress’ "factfinding" function. Rather, properly conceptualized, the Section 5 precedents are "emphatic" assertions of the Court’s power to interpret the Constitution. Although the Court apparently concedes that Congress may expand constitutional rights beyond those recognized by the judiciary, it leaves no room whatsoever for legislative interpretation. By contrast, agencies, even after Mead, may obtain judicial deference outside Chevron’s scope if their reasoning is thorough, their logic strong, their interpretation consistent with prior pronouncements, and if for any other reason the court finds the interpretation to be "persuasive." The author argues that because, as the Constitution prescribes, Congress shares the enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment with the Court, legislative constructions of rights should receive some degree of judicial deference. The Article urges the Court to consider its approach to review of agency interpretations of federal law as an appropriate model for review of Congress’s Section 5 enactments. Where there are enforcement gaps, the author urges the Court to respect and defer to legislative interpretations of constitutional rights based on the logic of Congress’s reasoning, the thoroughness of its proceedings, and any other factor that renders its interpretation persuasive.